llmthreat
For vendors27 vendors · 15 toolsMatrixVendors

AIR Security is an Agentic AI Security vendor based in New York, USA; staff in Israel. Its flagship product is AIR (AIR Control, AIR Filter, AIR Defend, AIR Marketplace). Against the OWASP LLM Top 10 (2026) we score it Covered on 0 of 10 risks, Partial on 3, with 4 MITRE ATLAS techniques mapped as of . It's independent.

0/10
Risks covered
3
Partial
4
ATLAS techniques
$50M
Funding
Active
Status

At a glance

Category
Agentic AI Security
Headquarters
New York, USA; staff in Israel
Founded
2026
Employees
11-50
Flagship product
AIR (AIR Control, AIR Filter, AIR Defend, AIR Marketplace)
Deployment
Sold through AWS Marketplace and Google Cloud Marketplace; deployment architecture is not publicly documented as of 2026-10-30
Best for
Enterprises with heavy coding-agent use that need continuous vetting of the skills, plugins and MCP servers those agents install
Funding to date
$50M
Last round
Seed ($40M) · 2026-09
Status
Active

Facts as of .

What does AIR Security do?

A firewall for agent context: vets skills, plugins, MCP servers and sub-agents before they reach an agent, then rechecks them after updates. It ships as Sold through AWS Marketplace and Google Cloud Marketplace; deployment architecture is not publicly documented as of 2026-10-30, and it's built for enterprises with heavy coding-agent use that need continuous vetting of the skills, plugins and MCP servers those agents install. It's a weaker fit for buyers who need documented model-level guardrails, data protection, or a public technical reference before a demo.

Which OWASP LLM Top 10 risks does AIR Security cover?

The two tables below come from our editorial read of AIR Security's public documentation as of (it's what the docs support, not a hands-on lab test), and this row also sits in the full matrix across all 27 vendors.

OWASP LLM Top 10 (2026) coverage — as of 2026-10-30
OWASP LLM RiskWhat it isAIR Security coverageHow it's addressedSource
LLM01 Prompt InjectionUser or hidden input overrides the model's rules or intended behavior.PartialAIR catches prompt injection in add-ons before production, but no runtime control over direct user prompts is documented.https://www.air.security/blog-posts/air-and-google-cloud-marketplace
LLM02 Sensitive Information DisclosureThe model leaks secrets, personal data, or proprietary content in its output.UnverifiedAIR lists data exfiltration as an add-on risk, but no data classification, redaction or DLP control is documented.https://www.air.security/
LLM03 Excessive AgencyAn agent holds more permissions, tools, or autonomy than the task needs.PartialAIR Control holds every agent to policy on config, identity and permissions, but runtime enforcement detail is not published.https://www.air.security/
LLM04 Supply ChainCompromised models, datasets, plugins, or dependencies add risk before runtime.PartialAIR Filter scans add-on dependencies and sandboxes skills, but no model-file or dataset provenance control is documented.https://www.air.security/blog-posts/anthropic-scanner
LLM05 Data and Model PoisoningTampered training or fine-tuning data corrupts how the model behaves.Not coveredAIR's documented scope is agent add-ons and runtime behavior, not training data or fine-tuning.https://www.air.security/blog-posts/out-of-stealth
LLM06 Unbounded ConsumptionUncontrolled requests drive cost, denial of service, or model extraction.UnverifiedNo rate limit, token budget or cost control found in AIR material as of 2026-10-30.None found
LLM07 MisinformationThe model produces false or fabricated content that users act on.UnverifiedNo hallucination or factual-accuracy control found in AIR material as of 2026-10-30.None found
LLM08 Hidden Context ExposureHidden instructions, retrieved policy text, or tool schemas get extracted, inferred, or reconstructed from the model.UnverifiedNo system-prompt or hidden-context protection found in AIR material as of 2026-10-30.None found
LLM09 Vector and Embedding WeaknessesFlaws in RAG stores let attackers poison, extract, or infer data.UnverifiedNo vector-store or embedding control found in AIR material as of 2026-10-30.None found
LLM10 Improper Output HandlingDownstream systems trust model output without checking it, enabling injection or code execution.UnverifiedNo output validation control found in AIR material as of 2026-10-30.None found
MITRE ATLAS coverage — as of 2026-10-30
ATLAS Technique (ID)TacticAIR Security coverageNotesSource
LLM Prompt Injection (AML.T0051)ExecutionPartialAIR catches prompt injection carried in add-ons before production.https://www.air.security/blog-posts/air-and-google-cloud-marketplace
AI Agent Tool Invocation (AML.T0053)Execution / Privilege Escalation / Lateral MovementUnverifiedAIR says its runtime layer enforces agent actions, but names no tool-call control.https://www.air.security/blog-posts/claude-air-integration
AI Agent Tool Poisoning (AML.T0110)PersistenceCoveredAIR Filter sandboxes skills and scans dependencies to expose hidden behavior in agent add-ons.https://www.air.security/blog-posts/anthropic-scanner
Supply Chain Compromise (AML.T0010)Initial AccessPartialAIR Filter and AIR Marketplace vet agent add-ons, but no control for models or datasets is documented.https://www.air.security/blog-posts/plugin4shell

Which OWASP Agentic risks does AIR Security cover?

1 of 10 Covered and 3 Partial against the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications, scored from public documentation as of 2026-10-30.

OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (2026) coverage — as of 2026-10-30
Agentic RiskWhat it isAIR Security coverageHow it's addressedSource
Agent Goal Hijack (ASI01)Attackers redirect what an agent is trying to do, often through documents or other content it reads.PartialAIR filters untrusted inputs before they reach agent context, with add-ons the documented path, so hijack through other content is unconfirmed.https://www.air.security/blog-posts/out-of-stealth
Tool Misuse and Exploitation (ASI02)An agent uses a legitimate tool in a harmful way, or a manipulated tool call does damage.UnverifiedAIR says its runtime layer enforces agent actions one by one, but no tool-level control is described.https://www.air.security/blog-posts/claude-air-integration
Identity and Privilege Abuse (ASI03)Agents inherit, reuse, or escalate credentials and permissions beyond what the task needs.PartialAIR identifies risky permissions across the agent fleet, but enforcement detail is not published.https://www.air.security/blog-posts/air-and-aws-marketplace
Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities (ASI04)Compromised MCP servers, plugins, skills, or agents enter the runtime.CoveredAIR Filter vets skills, plugins, MCPs and subagents before install, and AIR Marketplace supplies pre-vetted add-ons.https://www.air.security/
Unexpected Code Execution (ASI05)An agent generates or runs code that gives an attacker execution.PartialAIR Filter sandboxes skills to find hidden behavior before use, but blocking code execution at runtime is not documented.https://www.air.security/blog-posts/anthropic-scanner
Memory and Context Poisoning (ASI06)Attackers plant content in an agent's memory or context that shapes later decisions.UnverifiedAIR describes filtering what enters agent context, but no control for persistent agent memory is documented.https://www.air.security/blog-posts/out-of-stealth
Insecure Inter-Agent Communication (ASI07)Messages between agents get spoofed, intercepted, or tampered with.UnverifiedNo inter-agent message authentication or integrity control found in AIR material as of 2026-10-30.None found
Cascading Failures (ASI08)One fault spreads across connected agents and systems.UnverifiedNo containment control for failures spreading across agents found in AIR material as of 2026-10-30.None found
Human-Agent Trust Exploitation (ASI09)An agent's confident output talks a person into approving something harmful.UnverifiedNo control for manipulated human approval found in AIR material as of 2026-10-30.None found
Rogue Agents (ASI10)An agent drifts or is compromised and acts outside policy.UnverifiedAIR Defend is described as detect, respond and protect in real time, but no rogue-agent detection method is documented.https://www.air.security/

Is AIR Security independent, and how is it funded?

AIR Security is an independent company as of . It has raised $50M to date, most recently a Seed ($40M) dated 2026-09. Lead investors: Sequoia Capital, Greenoaks.

AIR Security alternatives

The closest alternatives we track in Agentic AI Security are Akto, Knostic, Straiker. On the open-source side, agent-scan covers similar ground.

Frequently asked questions

What is AIR Security used for?

AIR Security is an Agentic AI Security vendor. Its flagship product is AIR (AIR Control, AIR Filter, AIR Defend, AIR Marketplace). It ships as Sold through AWS Marketplace and Google Cloud Marketplace; deployment architecture is not publicly documented as of 2026-10-30, and it's built for enterprises with heavy coding-agent use that need continuous vetting of the skills, plugins and MCP servers those agents install.

Is AIR Security independent or acquired?

AIR Security is an independent company as of 2026-10-30 and has not been acquired.

How many OWASP LLM Top 10 risks does AIR Security cover?

We score AIR Security as Covered on 0 of the ten OWASP LLM Top 10 (2026) risks, with 3 more Partial, as of 2026-10-30. The table on this page breaks down every risk, including the ones marked Not covered or Unverified.

How is AIR Security deployed?

AIR Security ships as Sold through AWS Marketplace and Google Cloud Marketplace; deployment architecture is not publicly documented as of 2026-10-30.

What are the best alternatives to AIR Security?

The closest Agentic AI Security alternatives llmthreat tracks are Akto, Knostic, Straiker. On the open-source side, agent-scan covers similar ground.

Last verified . Sources: https://www.air.security/, https://www.air.security/blog-posts/out-of-stealth, https://www.air.security/blog-posts/air-and-aws-marketplace, https://www.air.security/blog-posts/air-and-google-cloud-marketplace, https://www.air.security/blog-posts/anthropic-scanner, https://www.air.security/blog-posts/claude-air-integration, https://www.air.security/blog-posts/plugin4shell, https://siliconangle.com/2026/09/01/air-security-launches-with-50m-to-build-a-firewall-for-ai-agents/, https://www.calcalistech.com/ctechnews/article/r13apdnugg, https://www.pymnts.com/news/investment-tracker/2026/ai-agent-security-startup-air-raises-50-million-to-guard-enterprise-supply-chains/. Funding and repo figures are third-party and go stale. Re-verify before you rely on them.
Informational, not professional security advice — verify AIR Security's claims and threat coverage against the official OWASP and MITRE sources and the vendor directly before making a purchasing or security decision. OWASP, MITRE, and the listed vendors and maintainers do not endorse llmthreat.com.