Operant AI is an AI-SPM / Runtime Protection vendor based in San Francisco, California, USA. Its flagship product is Operant platform (Semantic Firewall, Agent Protector, Endpoint Protector, MCP Gateway, AI Gatekeeper, 3D Runtime Defense, Token Meter). Against the OWASP LLM Top 10 (2026) we score it Covered on 4 of 10 risks, Partial on 3, with 6 MITRE ATLAS techniques mapped as of . It's independent.
- 4/10
- Risks covered
- 3
- Partial
- 6
- ATLAS techniques
- $13.5M
- Funding
- Active
- Status
At a glance
- Category
- AI-SPM / Runtime Protection
- Headquarters
- San Francisco, California, USA
- Founded
- 2021
- Employees
- 11-50
- Flagship product
- Operant platform (Semantic Firewall, Agent Protector, Endpoint Protector, MCP Gateway, AI Gatekeeper, 3D Runtime Defense, Token Meter)
- Deployment
- Helm install on Kubernetes 1.25+ across AWS, Azure, GCP and self-managed clusters, with a controller connecting to Operant cloud; Endpoint Protector runs on employee devices
- Best for
- Cloud-native teams running agents and MCP on Kubernetes that want inline blocking and redaction plus token spend limits
- Funding to date
- $13.5M
- Last round
- Series A ($10M) · 2024-09
- Status
- Active
Facts as of .
What does Operant AI do?
Enforces agent intent inline: Semantic Firewall, MCP Gateway and Endpoint Protector allow, block or redact before an action runs. It ships as Helm install on Kubernetes 1.25+ across AWS, Azure, GCP and self-managed clusters, with a controller connecting to Operant cloud; Endpoint Protector runs on employee devices, and it's built for cloud-native teams running agents and MCP on Kubernetes that want inline blocking and redaction plus token spend limits. It's a weaker fit for buyers who need hallucination checks, documented RAG or vector-store controls, or model-file scanning.
Which OWASP LLM Top 10 risks does Operant AI cover?
Operant AI's strongest verdict is LLM01 Prompt Injection. The two tables below come from our editorial read of Operant AI's public documentation as of (it's what the docs support, not a hands-on lab test), and this row also sits in the full matrix across all 27 vendors.
| OWASP LLM Risk | What it is | Operant AI coverage | How it's addressed | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LLM01 Prompt Injection | User or hidden input overrides the model's rules or intended behavior. | Covered | Semantic Firewall Code Intent Guard separates legitimate work from injected instructions and blocks inline. | https://www.operant.ai/platform/semantic-firewall |
| LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure | The model leaks secrets, personal data, or proprietary content in its output. | Covered | Data Intent Guard enforces access by data sensitivity and redacts the sensitive span inline. | https://www.operant.ai/platform/semantic-firewall |
| LLM03 Excessive Agency | An agent holds more permissions, tools, or autonomy than the task needs. | Covered | Agent ScopeGuard sets the data sources, APIs and workflows each agent may use and blocks out-of-scope actions before execution. | https://www.operant.ai/platform/agent-protector |
| LLM04 Supply Chain | Compromised models, datasets, plugins, or dependencies add risk before runtime. | Partial | CodeInjectionGuard intercepts agent-initiated package installs, but no model-file or dataset provenance scanning is documented. | https://www.operant.ai/solutions/code-agents |
| LLM05 Data and Model Poisoning | Tampered training or fine-tuning data corrupts how the model behaves. | Partial | Open-source Woodpecker includes an llm-data-poisoning experiment, which is test-only, and no runtime control over training data is detailed. | https://raw.githubusercontent.com/OperantAI/woodpecker/main/experiments/llm-data-poisoning.yaml |
| LLM06 Unbounded Consumption | Uncontrolled requests drive cost, denial of service, or model extraction. | Covered | Token Meter tracks token use live and caps a single service, app, team, user, agent or model. | https://www.operant.ai/solutions/token-meter |
| LLM07 Misinformation | The model produces false or fabricated content that users act on. | Unverified | No hallucination or factual-accuracy control found on Operant product pages as of 2026-10-30. | None found |
| LLM08 Hidden Context Exposure | Hidden instructions, retrieved policy text, or tool schemas get extracted, inferred, or reconstructed from the model. | Unverified | No system-prompt or hidden-context protection found on Operant product pages as of 2026-10-30. | None found |
| LLM09 Vector and Embedding Weaknesses | Flaws in RAG stores let attackers poison, extract, or infer data. | Unverified | The AI Security page says Operant secures RAG, but no vector-store or embedding control is named. | https://www.operant.ai/solutions/ai-security |
| LLM10 Improper Output Handling | Downstream systems trust model output without checking it, enabling injection or code execution. | Partial | Code Intent Guard inspects generated commands, scripts and shell calls before execution, but web and query output paths are not documented. | https://www.operant.ai/platform/semantic-firewall |
| ATLAS Technique (ID) | Tactic | Operant AI coverage | Notes | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LLM Prompt Injection (AML.T0051) | Execution | Covered | Semantic Firewall reads every prompt, tool call and command before it executes and blocks injected instructions inline. | https://www.operant.ai/platform/semantic-firewall |
| LLM Jailbreak (AML.T0054) | Defense Evasion / Privilege Escalation | Partial | MCP Gateway detects jailbreaks, and a specific jailbreak block is not documented. | https://www.operant.ai/solutions/mcp-gateway |
| Exfiltration via AI User Interface (AML.T0136) | Exfiltration | Covered | MCP Gateway blocks data flows and redacts sensitive data automatically. | https://www.operant.ai/solutions/mcp-gateway |
| AI Agent Tool Invocation (AML.T0053) | Execution / Privilege Escalation / Lateral Movement | Covered | Tool Intent Guard judges what each tool call does and blocks unsafe calls before execution. | https://www.operant.ai/platform/semantic-firewall |
| AI Agent Tool Poisoning (AML.T0110) | Persistence | Covered | MCP Gateway detects tool poisoning and blocks untrusted servers and tools in real time. | https://www.operant.ai/solutions/mcp-gateway |
| Supply Chain Compromise (AML.T0010) | Initial Access | Partial | CodeInjectionGuard stops malicious packages in coding agents, but no model or dataset supply chain control is documented. | https://www.operant.ai/solutions/code-agents |
Which OWASP Agentic risks does Operant AI cover?
6 of 10 Covered and 3 Partial against the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications, scored from public documentation as of 2026-10-30.
| Agentic Risk | What it is | Operant AI coverage | How it's addressed | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Agent Goal Hijack (ASI01) | Attackers redirect what an agent is trying to do, often through documents or other content it reads. | Covered | Scope Guard holds an agent to its assigned purpose across the session and flags drift from manipulation at every hop. | https://www.operant.ai/platform/semantic-firewall |
| Tool Misuse and Exploitation (ASI02) | An agent uses a legitimate tool in a harmful way, or a manipulated tool call does damage. | Covered | Tool Intent Guard reads the impact of each tool call and blocks exfiltration, bulk dumps and credential access. | https://www.operant.ai/platform/semantic-firewall |
| Identity and Privilege Abuse (ASI03) | Agents inherit, reuse, or escalate credentials and permissions beyond what the task needs. | Covered | Agent Protector catalogs agent identities and blocks attempts to escalate privileges inline. | https://www.operant.ai/platform/agent-protector |
| Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities (ASI04) | Compromised MCP servers, plugins, skills, or agents enter the runtime. | Covered | MCP Gateway blocks untrusted servers and tools in real time and maps trust scores across the agent supply chain. | https://www.operant.ai/solutions/mcp-gateway |
| Unexpected Code Execution (ASI05) | An agent generates or runs code that gives an attacker execution. | Covered | Code Intent Guard inspects generated code before execution and blocks shell breakout and privilege escalation inline. | https://www.operant.ai/platform/semantic-firewall |
| Memory and Context Poisoning (ASI06) | Attackers plant content in an agent's memory or context that shapes later decisions. | Partial | Agent Protector traces memory store access, and its claim to prevent memory poisoning names no specific control. | https://www.operant.ai/platform/agent-protector |
| Insecure Inter-Agent Communication (ASI07) | Messages between agents get spoofed, intercepted, or tampered with. | Partial | Agent Protector claims continuous authentication and authorization for agent-to-agent interactions, with no named mechanism. | https://www.operant.ai/platform/agent-protector |
| Cascading Failures (ASI08) | One fault spreads across connected agents and systems. | Partial | MCP Gateway blocks lateral movement and reduces blast radius, but no cascade containment across agents is documented. | https://www.operant.ai/solutions/mcp-gateway |
| Human-Agent Trust Exploitation (ASI09) | An agent's confident output talks a person into approving something harmful. | Unverified | Agent Protector says consequential decisions stay with humans, but no control against manipulated human approval is named. | https://www.operant.ai/platform/agent-protector |
| Rogue Agents (ASI10) | An agent drifts or is compromised and acts outside policy. | Covered | Agent ScopeGuard blocks out-of-scope actions in real time, and Agent Protector targets rogue and misaligned agents. | https://www.operant.ai/platform/agent-protector |
Is Operant AI independent, and how is it funded?
Operant AI is an independent company as of . It has raised $13.5M to date, most recently a Series A ($10M) dated 2024-09. Lead investors: SineWave Ventures, Felicis.
Operant AI alternatives
The closest alternatives we track in AI-SPM / Runtime Protection are Apiiro, Cranium, HiddenLayer.
Frequently asked questions
What is Operant AI used for?
Operant AI is an AI-SPM / Runtime Protection vendor. Its flagship product is Operant platform (Semantic Firewall, Agent Protector, Endpoint Protector, MCP Gateway, AI Gatekeeper, 3D Runtime Defense, Token Meter). It ships as Helm install on Kubernetes 1.25+ across AWS, Azure, GCP and self-managed clusters, with a controller connecting to Operant cloud; Endpoint Protector runs on employee devices, and it's built for cloud-native teams running agents and MCP on Kubernetes that want inline blocking and redaction plus token spend limits.
Is Operant AI independent or acquired?
Operant AI is an independent company as of 2026-10-30 and has not been acquired.
How many OWASP LLM Top 10 risks does Operant AI cover?
We score Operant AI as Covered on 4 of the ten OWASP LLM Top 10 (2026) risks, with 3 more Partial, as of 2026-10-30. The table on this page breaks down every risk, including the ones marked Not covered or Unverified.
How is Operant AI deployed?
Operant AI ships as Helm install on Kubernetes 1.25+ across AWS, Azure, GCP and self-managed clusters, with a controller connecting to Operant cloud; Endpoint Protector runs on employee devices.
What are the best alternatives to Operant AI?
The closest AI-SPM / Runtime Protection alternatives llmthreat tracks are Apiiro, Cranium, HiddenLayer.